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VOLUME 30 FEBRUARY, 1955 NUMBER 1
TAFT-HARTLEY AND STATE POWER TO REGULATE
LABOR RELATIONS
DONALD H. WOLLETI*
I. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
While the United States Supreme Court has in recent years held that
the states have wide powers under the Fourteenth Amendment to regu-
late labor relations,' it has during the same period circumscribed state
authority over matters falling within the purview of Title I of Taft-
Hartley viz., the National Labor Relations Act.2
The basic proposition upon which the decisions rest is simple. Con-
gress has the power under the commerce clause to regulate labor rela-
tions in industries affecting commerce among the several states.' In the
exercise of that power Congress may exclude the states from regulation
of the same subject matter. The question in each case is whether or not
the action of Congress has precluded state regulation of the type at
issue.4
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Washington. Parts of this article were
written by the author for the annual report of the Committee on State Labor Legisla-
tion (Section of Labor Relations Law, American Bar Association) of which he is
chairman.
1 The following cases sustained state restraints of picketing: Teamsters v. Hanke,
339 U.S. 470 (1950) ; Bldg. Serv. Employees v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950) ; Hughes
v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950). Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice. Co., 336
U.S. 490 (1949); Plumbers & Steamfitters v. Graham Bros., 345 U.S. 192 (1953).
State right-to-work statutes regulating union security agreements have also been
upheld against constitutional attack on due process grounds. See Lincoln Federal Labor
Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949) ; Whitaker v. North
Carolina, 335 U.S. 525 (1949); AFL v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538(1949).2 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 et. seq.
3 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
4 See California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949).
I
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A. COINCIDENTAL STATE REGULATION
The problem arises when state regulation parallels, or is similar to,
federal regulation, i.e., regulates the same subject matter or imposes
substantially identical duties. Such state regulation is improper if it
conflicts with federal regulation or if it intrudes into a field occupied
exclusively by Congress.
Thus, it is settled that the states may not decide questions of em-
ployee representation in industries over which the National Labor
Relations Board customarily exercises jurisdiction.' The NLRB has
exclusive jurisdiction over such proceedings. The rationale of the
Court's position is that "the situation is too fraught with potential con-
flict to permit the intrusion of the state agency, even though the Na-
tional Board had not acted in the particular case."6
1. The Garner Case
It also appears to be equally well settled, albeit on a different ground,
that a state may not give preventive remedies, e.g., an injunction, for
employer or union conduct which constitutes a federal unfair labor
practice. Two cases support this conclusion.
Plankinton Packing Co. v. WERB involved a state unfair labor
practice similar to the federal unfair labor practice. Although the
NLRB most probably would have decided the case as the state board
did, the Court struck down the state order. Since no serious danger of
conflict or inconsistency existed, the decision seemingly could be ration-
alized only on the theory that federal authority under the NLRA is
exclusive in the field in which it is exerted, leaving the cases to turn on
a judgment as to the dimensions of the occupied field. Since the decision
was unaccompanied by opinion, this conclusion was subject to some
doubt.
The Court's decision during the 1953-54 term in Garner v. Team-
sters8 appears to set this doubt at rest. The facts were as follows.
A local of the Teamsters was picketing the platforms of a trucking
concern whose activities affected interstate commerce. Four of 24 em-
ployees were members of the union. The objectives of the picketing
were to get recognition and to force the employer to compel his em-
ployees to join the union. The employer had a remedy under a Pennsyl-
5 Bethlehem Steel Co. v. NY SLRB, 330 U.S. 767 (1947); LaCrosse Telephone
Corp. v. WERB, 336 U.S. 18 (1949).
r 336 U.S. at 25.
7338 U.S. 953 (1950).
8 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
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vania statute or under Section 8 (b) (2) of the NLRA. He chose the
former and sought an injunction in state court. The court gave relief
on the ground that the picketing violated state law. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court reversed. On certiorari the United States Supreme
Court held, without dissent, that the state court lacked power to enjoin
the picketing because the matter lay within the field occupied exclu-
sively by the NLRA. In reaching its conclusion the Court rejected
either the validity or the materiality of the distinction between private
rights enforced by injunction and public rights enforced by administra-
tive order.
On its facts Garner applies only to union conduct. But there is no
apparent reason in this context for distinguishing between employer
and union unfair labor practices. It follows, therefore, that Garner con-
firms the suggested rationale of Plankinton. Whether employer or em-
ployee conduct is at issue, state power to regulate turns on a judgment
as to the dimensions of the field occupied exclusively by the NLRB.
And conduct which violates the federal act generally falls within that
field.'
It follows from Garner, and the Court so held, that the states may
not provide local remedies for violations of the NLRA pending action
by the NLRB. 1° The decision has had a wide impact.'
2. The Capital Service Case
An issue related to Garner arises when a state court, despite the
teaching of that case, issues an injunction against conduct which ap-
pears to violate the NLRA, and the NLRB or the enjoined party seeks
a federal decree staying enforcement of the injunction.
9 Clear exceptions exist under Section 14 (a) when the NLRB has executed an
agreement ceding jurisdiction to a state board and under Section 14 (b) which expressly
empowers the states to regulate the execution and enforcement of union security agree-
ments. On the latter point compare Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. WERB, 336
U.S. 301 (1949).
1o See Building Trades Council v. Kinard Construction Co., 346 U.S. 933 (1954),
reversing an Alabama decree which enjoined picketing on the theory that it constituted
a violation of the NLRA. The Court's reversal was based on Garner.
"Following the decision in Building Trades Council v. Kinard Construction Co.,
346 U.S. 933 (1954), Alabama held that it did not have jurisdiction to enjoin picket-
ing which affects interstate commerce and for which there is an NLRB remedy.
Building Trades Council v. Ledbetter Co., 70 So.2d 809 (1954). See also Groom v.
Teamsters, 34 LRRM 2440 (Calif. Sup. Ct., Sonoma County, 1954); Wichita Falls
R. R. v. Machinists, 33 LRRM 2609 (Tex. Ct. of Civ. App., 1954); General Tele-
radio, Inc. v. Manuti, 129 N.Y.S.2d 757 (N.Y. Sup. Ct, 1954) ; Busch & Sons, Inc. v.
Retail Union, 15 N.J. 226, 104 A2d 448 (1954) ; WERB v. Teamsters, 66 N.W.2d 318
(Wis., 1954) ; Grimes & Hauer v. Pollock, 119 N.E.2d 889 (Ohio App., 1954) ; Your
Food Stores v. Retail Clerks, 121 Fed. Supp. 339 (N.M., 1954); Cooper Transport
Co. v. Stuffibeam, 34 LRRM 2312,--S.W. 2d-(Mo., 1954). Cf. Pilot Freight Carriers
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In Capital Service, Inc. v. NLRB 2 the union attempted to organize
the employees of the petitioner, a manufacturer and distributor of
bakery goods, by picketing retail stores handling his products. Some
employees of other employers refused to cross the picket lines. Peti-
tioner had both a state and a federal remedy. Unlike Garner, he chose
to seek both of them. He filed suit for an injunction in a California
court as well as an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB. The
California court enjoined all picketing of the retail stores. Five weeks
later the NLRB Regional Director issued a complaint under Section
8 (b) (4) of the NLRA. As required by Section 10 (1) of the act the
Regional Director also petitioned the federal district court for an in-
junction against the picketing pending final adjudication of the matter
by the Board. At the same time he filed suit in the same district court
asking that the petitioner be enjoined from enforcing the state court
injunction. Concluding that the conduct of the union was subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB, the district court enjoined the
petitioner from enforcing the state court decree. The 9th Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed, as did the Supreme Court.
Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, pointed out that where
Congress has constitutionally vested a federal agency with exclusive
jurisdiction over subject matter and the intrusion of a state would result
in a conflict of functions, the federal court may enjoin the state proceed-
ing in order to preserve the federal right. However, he did not stand on
this ground. Instead, he relied on Section 2283 of the Judicial Code
which prohibits stays by a federal court of state court proceedings
except, inter alia, "where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction." Since the
district court had taken jurisdiction over the unfair labor practice under
Section (1) of the NLRA, the exception was held applicable.
The Court left open the question of whether the injunction could
properly issue where the NLRB has taken jurisdiction of the case but
has not sought interlocutory relief in federal court. The NLRB is com-
pelled to seek such relief only where the complaint is issued under
v. De Perno, 34 LRRM 2344 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Albany, 1954) and Tube Distributors
Co. v. Silverman, 33 LRRM 2404 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 1954).
The Garner doctrine is not, of course, applicable to an action brought in state
court under Section 303 of Taft-Hartley. Section 303 makes the conduct proscribed by
Section 8 (b) (4) of the NLRA the basis for a suit for damages in any district court
of the United States or in "any other court having jurisdiction of the parties." The
state court must apply federal law, and since the cause of action is federal, it is
removable.
There have been no Washington cases squarely on the point. But Garner seems
plainly to nullify such decisions as Swenson v. Seattle Central Labor Council, 27 Wn.2d
193, 177 P.2d 873 (1947).
12 347 U.S. 501 (1954).
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Section 8 (b) (4). In all other cases the power lies in the Board under
Section 10 (j), but it is discretionary, and is sparingly exercised."
Thus, the question which the Court left open is one of some importance.
Recent cases indicate that an injunction will issue where the NLRB,
after having taken jurisdiction over the case, seeks the relief." In other
situations it will not. 5
3. The Implications of Garner: The Laburnum Case
Garner might be read to hold that if the plaintiff can get an NLRB
remedy for the defendant's conduct, he is foreclosed from getting any
form of state relief for the same conduct. However, the dicta of the
opinion militate against such an interpretation, and the Court has made
it plain that such a broad reading of Garner is incorrect.
Construction Workers v. Laburnum Corp.Y presented the following
problem.'A union affiliated with District 50 of the United Mine Work-
ers demanded that respondent's employees on a construction job join
it and that it be recognized as their exclusive bargaining agent. Re-
spondent refused, as did many of his employees who had been supplied
to the respondent under agreement with an AFL Building and Con-
struction Trades Council. There followed threats of violence and in-
timidation by large numbers of men, some armed. As a result respondent
was compelled-to abandon all projects in the area. Laburnum brought
a common-law tort action in a Virginia court asking for compensatory
and punitive damages. The judgment entered on the jury's verdict for
Laburnum was affirmed by the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. On
certiorari the United States Supreme Court held that the NLRB did
not have exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter so as to preclude
the state court from hearing and determining the issues in a common-
law tort action based upon this conduct.
1361 STAT. 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (j).
14 In NLRB v. NYSRB, 106 Fed. Supp. 749 (S.D. N.Y. 1952), an injunction was
issued against state proceedings after the NLRB had taken jurisdiction of the matter
in order to protect the Board's exclusive jurisdiction.
15 In Clothing Workers v. Richman Brothers, 211 F.2d 449 (C.A. 6, 1954), cert.
granted, 75 S. Ct. 43, relief was denied to a union seeking to prohibit an employer who
had sought an NLRA remedy from proceeding in state court, even though the state
court lacked jurisdiction under the Garner case. The union's remedy, said the court,
was to appeal the state court decision or'file a charge with the NLRB on the theory
that the employer was utilizing state judicial machinery for the purpose of blocking
communications between employees, conduct held an unfair labor practice in W. T.
Carter & Bros., 90 NLRB 2020 (1950). Cf. I.U.O.E. v. Baker, 100 Fed. Supp. 773(E.D. Pa. 1951). However, the state court action may be removable, even though it
purports to be grounded on state law. Direct Transit Lines v. Mackey, 34 LRRM 2572
-Fed Supp.-(Mich, 1954) ; Overton v. Int'l. Brotherhood, etc., 115 Fed. Supp. 764
(Mich., 1953).
10 347 U.S. 656 (1954).
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The Court assumed that the conduct constituted an unfair labor
practice under Section 8 (b) (1) (A) of the NLRA and that the NLRB
would have taken jurisdiction if its services had been sought, thus
making it necessary to distinguish the Garner case. This was accom-
plished by pointing out the difference between the "preventive pro-
cedures" of the NLRB and the "compensatory or punitive procedures"
of the common law. State court action through an injunction may be
at war with federal action under circumstances where state court action
through a judgment for damages would not be.
As Justice Burton, speaking for the Court, put it:
To the extent that Congress prescribed preventive procedure against
unfair labor practices . . . [the Garner case] recognized that the Act
excluded conflicting state procedure to the same end. To the extent,
however, that Congress has not prescribed procedure for dealing with the
consequences of tortious conduct already committed, there is no ground
for concluding that existing criminal penalties or liabilities for tortious
conduct have been eliminated. The care we took in the Garner case to
demonstrate the existing conflict between state and federal administrative
remedies in that case was, itself, a recognition that if no conflicts had
existed, the state procedure would have survived. 1'7
Justices Douglas and Black, dissenting in an opinion by the former,
argued that the difference in federal and state remedies was immaterial.
I think that for each wrong which the federal Act recognizes the parties
have only the remedy supplied by the Act-and for a simple reason. The
federal Act was designed to decide labor-management controversies, to
bring them to a peaceful, orderly settlement, to put the parties on the
basis of equality which the rules designed by Congress envisaged. If the
parties not only have the remedy Congress provided but the right to sue
for damages as well, the controversy is not settled by what the federal
agency does. It drags on and on in the courts, keeping old wounds open,
and robbing the administrative remedy of the healing effects it was
intended to have.' 8
Unfortunately the opinion in Laburnum does not clearly identify the
exact ground upon which the Court rested its decision. The case is sub-
ject to two interpretations.
First, Laburnum may be read to mean that the states are free to
grant as a remedy for conduct which violates both state and federal
law any form of compensatory relief which is not available in a pro-
ceeding before the NLRB. It is significant that the Court held several
17 347 U.s. at 665.
18 347 U.S. at 671.
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years ago that the NLRA does not preclude the states from exercising
their historic powers over such traditionally local matters as public
safety and order and the use of streets and highways. Accordingly, the
Court sustained the use by a state of even "preventive procedures" to
stop mass picketing, threatening of employees, obstructing streets and
highways, and picketing homes.'9 Since the Court did not choose to
stand on this ground in Laburnum, it may be argued that the doctrine
of the case extends beyond situations of violence and breaches of the
peace and permits state "compensatory procedures" whenever they are
not provided by the NLRA. Under this view, for example, while a state
may not enjoin peaceful picketing which constitutes an unfair labor
practice under the NLRA, it may make such conduct the basis of a
judgment for damages.2" Conversely, where a compensatory remedy for
union conduct is available from the NLRB, the state is without power
to grant it, even though the conduct involves violence and breaches of
the peace.
Second, Laburnum may be read to mean that the states are free to
grant compensatory forms of relief only when (a) they are not available
under the NLRA and (b) the substantive basis for the state decree is a
concern for matters other than the method of resolving conflicts of
interest between employers and employees. It is plain that the Court
was heavily influenced in Laburnum by the fact that the union had
transgressed a state law of general applicability. As the opinion puts it:
If Virginia is denied jurisdiction in this case, it will mean that where
the federal preventive administrative procedures are impotent or inade-
quate, the offenders by coercion of the type found here, may destroy
property without liability for the damage done. If petitioners were
unorganized private persons, conducting themselves as petitioners did
here, Virginia would have had undoubted jurisdiction of this action
against them. The fact that petitioners are labor organizations, with no
contractual relationship with respondent or its employees, provides no
reasonable basis for a different conclusion..
2
'
This language suggests-that the states may grant compensatory forms
of relief only where the union's conduct transgresses state laws which
are not designed to regulate labor relations but are intended to govern
the conduct of all persons. The inadequacy of the remedy provided in
the NLRA means that Congress did not intend that unions, just because
10 Allen-Bradley Local 1111 v. WERB, 315 U.S. 740 (1942).
20 Compare Texas Federation of Labor v. Brown & Root Inc., 29 LRRM 2467
(Tex. Civ. App. 1952). See also Buffalo Arms, Inc. v. Molony, 34 LRRM 2757-
Fed. Supp.-(W.D. N.Y. 1954).
21347 U.S. at 669.
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they are unions, should enjoy immunity from local laws which are
applicable to everyone else. Where the state decree is grounded upon
a concern for protecting interests which only incidentally bear on labor-
management relations or with respect to which the NLRA reflects no
policy, state regulation in the form of compensatory relief not available
from the NLRB is permissible.
Under this view, the states are free to enforce with supplementary
remedies only local laws which govern the conduct of all persons-
corporations, labor unions, or otherwise-and only incidentally regu-
late labor relations. The states may protect persons and property against
physical injury and enforce other local laws of general applicability,
e.g., trust or insurance law, even though such enforcement regulates
some of the aspects of labor relations as well as other types of economic
arrangements and conduct. On the other hand, state regulation which
is grounded upon a concern for employers vis-h-vis unions (or vice-
versa) or otherwise reflects a policy of regulating aspects of labor-
management relations dealt with affirmatively by the NLRA may not
be implemented even by supplemental remedies. Thus, for example, the
states may not give damages for injury caused by striking and picketing
on the ground that the objective of the conduct was "unlawful" because
the NLRA manifests a Congressional policy as to which objectives of
union self-help are "lawful" and which "unlawful." However, the states
may grant damages for injury caused by striking and picketing on the
ground that the method by which it is carried out is unlawful because
Congress has manifested no interest in the policing of such conduct7-
The holding in Laburnum does not foreclose, since it was not in issue,
the possibility of a third position-viz: that where the substantive basis
for the state decree is a policy broader than the state's interest in regu-
lating labor relations, the states may not only grant forms of relief not
available under the NLRA but may grant any appropriate remedy, in-
cluding "preventive procedures." This interpretation is based upon the
assumption that the basis of state regulation, i.e., the interests pro-
tected, rather than the type of remedy employed is decisive in determin-
ing whether the state has intruded into the field occupied exclusively by
Congress. The assumption has little support in the language of the
Laburnum opinion, but it is supported by analogy."
22 Compare International Union v. WERB, 336 U.S. 245 (1949), with Teamsters v.
Whitfield Transportation, Inc., 34 LRRM 2555,--S.W.2d-(Tex., 1954).
23 Compare Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410 (1847), with United States v. Marigold, 9
How. 560, 568-570 (1850).
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Under this view the states may not only grant damages for injury
caused by union conduct in order to protect interests with which Con-
gress was not concerned; they may also prohibit such conduct. Compare
International Union v. WERB, upholding the power of a state to
prohibit sporadic, "quickie" strikes, and Allen Bradley Local 111 v.
WERB, upholding the power of a state to prohibit mass picketing."
Under this analysis Laburnum is an a fortiori case. Since the states may
give preventive remedies, they may also give compensatory remedies?.2
The only limitation is that the state may not adopt a preventive remedy
which conflicts so directly and positively with the federal regulation
that the two cannot be reconciled or consistently stand together.
Which of these positions ultimately will prevail obviously cannot be
foretold with certainty. However, the third seems more consistent both
with the Court's earlier decisions involving the pre-emptive effect of the
NLRA as well as the decisions in other fields,2" particularly where the
state regulation falls within the "usual police powers," e.g., protection
against violence and breaches of the peace.
It must be emphasized, however, that this is an area of law where
broad premises and dryly logical conclusions are peculiarly dangerous.
The Court has eschewed enunciating mechanical rules." Thus, doctrines
with respect to state power to regulate striking and picketing are not
necessarily applicable to cases where the issue is state power to regulate
some other kind of union conduct.
The point is particularly important in light of the recent decision of
the Washington Supreme Court dealing with state power to protect an
individual who has suffered loss of employment by virtue of expulsion
from a union. John Mahoney was expelled from the Sailors' Union of
the Pacific and brought an action seeking reinstatement and damages
measured by loss of wages. On the ground that the expulsion violated
both the contract between plaintiff and defendant created by the union
constitution as well as standards of procedural due process, thereby
24336 U.S. 245 (1949).
28 315 U.S. 740 (1942). See also Perez v. Trifiletti, 34 LRRM 2625,-So.2d-(Fla.,
1954), distinguishing Garner and granting an injunction against violent picketing.
Accord: Wortex Mills v. Textile Workers Union, 35 LRRM 2132 (Pa. Sup. Ct.
E.D. 1954).
26 Compare Russell v. United Automobile Workers, 64 So.2d 384 (Alabama, 1953),
and United Mineral & Chemical Corp. v. Katz, 118 Fed. Supp. 433 (E.D.N.Y. 1954).
27 CoX and Seidman, Federalism and Labor Relations, 64 HARv. L. REv. 211, 236,
240 (1950); Cox, 7he Right to Engage in Concerted Activities, 26 IND. L.J. 320,
340-344 (1951).
28 California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949).
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abridging Mahoney's property rights in employment, the Washington
Court granted the relief sought. 9
Subsequently the court granted a petition for a rehearing and held
that it had power to grant reinstatement to the union but that damages
measured by loss of wages was relief exclusively within the jurisdiction
of the NLRB.3"
The court's opinion states that two different kinds of property in-
terests underlie Mahoney's cause of action: (1) his right to employ-
ment; and (2) his right to union membership. Section 8 (b) (2) of the
NLRA protects the former against union interferences based upon lack
of good standing except where the failure to acquire or retain good
standing results from non-tender of dues and fees. The NLRB is em-
powered to remedy such interferences by both preventive means, e.g.,
an order directing the union to cease and desist and to request employ-
ers to offer employment, and compensatory means, e.g., an order direct-
ing the union to make the employee whole for wages lost as a result of
the unlawful interference.
The court then finds that the union's interference with Mahoney's
right to employment violated Section 8 (b) (2), and holds that Garner
prohibits the issuance of injunctive relief. With respect to compensatory
relief, Laburnum is not in point because there the state court remedy,
damages for loss of profits, was not available as an NLRB remedy while
in Mahoney damages for loss of wages was within the Board's remedial
power. Thus, the state lacks power to grant either preventive or com-
pensatory relief.
However, said the court, since the NLRA does not protect the latter
interest-viz, property rights inherent in union membership, e.g., the
burial benefits plan, the state has the power to direct Mahoney's rein-
statement to the union.
Insofar as the decision supports state power to protect union mem-
bership it is plainly correct. The proviso to Section 8 (b) (1) (A)31 of
the NLRA states that it does not impair the right of a labor organiza-
tion to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or reten-
tion of union membership. The fact that the NLRA does not regulate
such union rules can -hardly be supposed to manifest a national labor
policy that they are to be free of state regulation. To ascribe such an
intent to Congress in the absence of supporting statutory language or
29 Mahoney v. S.U.P., 43 Wn.2d 874, 264 P.2d 1095 (1953).
30 Mahoney v. S.U.P., 145 Wash. Dec. 422 (1954).
3161 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (1).
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legislative history would result in circumscribing state power in order
"to satisfy a congressional purpose which would be only the product
of ... [the] Court's imagination,"32 particularly when the states have
historically exercised such power.
It is less clear that the decision denying state power to protect the
right to employment is correct. The basic question in these cases is
whether national policy precludes state regulation of the type at issue,
and the answer turns on a judgment as to Congressional motivation."'
Congressional intent is first of all ascertained from the language of the
statute. Section 14 (b) of the NLRA3 makes it clear that the states
are free to protect the right to-work against interferences based upon
lack of membership or good standing in a union. Indeed, seventeen
states have passed right-to-work statutes which restrict job discrimina-
tion by reason of non-membership in a union. 4
Thus, Washington might, without running afoul of the preemption
doctrine, either by decisional or statutory law prohibit all contractual
arrangements which tie employment to membership in a particular
union and give both compensatory and preventive remedies for viola-
tions. 5 Since the national labor policy permits the states to protect
the interest in employment to this extent, it is rather surprising that
the policy prohibits them from protecting it to a lesser extent.
Moreover, Garner does not necessarily control in cases involving
state regulation of union discipline which interferes with the right to
work. The point may be made by example.
The Washington decisions in Gazzam v. Building Service Employees 6
and Ostroff v. Drivers"7 stand for the proposition that organizational
picketing to compel an employer to force his employees to join a union
32 California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949), sustaining state coincidental regulation
of sellers and arrangers of "share-expense" passenger transportation in automobiles
using the public highways. When answers to the question of congressional motivation
are not found either in statutory language or legislative history, the Court is influenced
by the nature of the interest which the state seeks to protect. If it is an interest within
the tradition of "usual police powers" or one in which the states rather than C6ngress
have had an historic concern, the Court is disposed to sustain the exercise of state
power. Compare Zook with Southern Ry. Co. v. R.R. Comm. of Indiana, 236 U.S. 439
(1915), where the Court struck down state regulation requiring railroad cars operating
within the state to have hand-holds on their sides or ends.
32a For a discussion of the difficulties involved in ascertaining congressional intent,
see Cox and Seidman, Federalism and Labor Relations, 64 HARv. L. Rav. 211, 224-228(1950).
3361 STAT. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 164 (b).
14 See A.B.A. Rep. on State Labor Legislation for 1953-54.
35 See, for example, the Louisiana Right-to-Work Law, set forth in full at 34
LRRM 3001.
38629 Wn2d 488, 188 P2d 97 (1947).
3737 Wn.2d 595, 225 P.2d 419 (1950).
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is unlawful and enjoinable. While this form of state regulation does not
violate the 14th Amendment,3 8 it seems clear that Garner makes the
Gazzam-Ostroff rule inapplicable to industries over which the NLRB
customarily takes jurisdiction.,,a This follows because Gazzam-Ostrofi
not only protects the employees' freedom to select or reject a union,
a right guaranteed by Section 7 of the NLRA, from a specified type of
interference-viz., picketing for a union shop, but it also operates as
a restraint on union self-help which injures employers. Garner holds
that such restraints of conduct violative of the NLRA, at least where
preventive in nature, are the exclusive business of the NLRB.
Suppose the Washington Court holds that employee freedom of
choice is protected against other interferences, e.g., an employer is
enjoined from assisting a union's organizational campaign by firing his
non-member workers. Does Garner by implication preclude such state
action? Since the basis of the decree is the same policy that underlies
Section 8 (a) (1) and Section 8 (a) (3)-viz, protection of freedom
of choice from employer interferences, seemingly it does. 9
Does it follow from these conclusions that a state is without any
power to protect the right to work against employer and union inter-
ferences based upon lack of membership? Plainly it does not, even
though such regulation incidentally protects both employer freedom
from injurious picketing and employee freedom of choice. Such state
laws are not basically concerned with injurious picketing or freedom
of choice; they are concerned with the interest in employment. Section
14 (b) permits state protection of this interest.
Since in fact closed shop agreements are lawful in Washington," and
the right to work apparently is not protected against any employer
interferences and is protected only against union interferences incident
to organizational picketing, it may be argued that the state law applied
in Mahoney is a direct regulation of internal union affairs and not a
protection of the right to work permitted by Section 14 (b). Ana-
lytically this argument seems sound. If it is sound, the fragmentary
interest which the NLRA manifests in such matters4 points strongly
3 Bldg. Serv. Employees v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950).
38a See Wollett, Another Look at Picketing in Washington, 26 WASH. L. REV. 169,
182-183 (fn. 49) (1951).
39 See Plankinton Packing Co. v. WERB, 338 U.S. 953 (1950), and discussion
supra, at pp. 2 to 3.
40 Yeager v. Teamsters, 39 Wn.2d 807, 239 P.2d 318 (1951).
41 The following provisions of the NLRA regulate internal union affiairs: Section
8(b) (5), 61 STAT. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (5) (prohibiting, where a union
shop agreement is in effect, an excessive or discriminatory fee as a condition of requir-
ing membership) ; Section 9 (f), (g) and (h), 61 STAT. 145-146 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
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to the conclusion that their regulation was left to the states, unless
Section 8 (b) (2), because of the risk of inconsistentcy with national
labor policy, compels a different result.
It is doubtful that 8 (b) (2) has this effect. The policy lying behind
the state rule that the worker who is improperly expelled from a union
is entitled to protection of the property interests which inhere in
membership is different than the policy which lies behind 8 (b) (2).
The former is a direct regulation of union action bearing on the reten-
tion of membership and only incidentally a regulation of employment
rights-viz., they are protected only as necessary to provide an ade-
quate remedy for the cause of action.
On the other hand, 8 (b) (2) is concerned primarily with employee
freedom of choice and protection of employment. It is only incidentally
a regulation of union disciplinary action, Thus, a union may expel a
member for any reason or no reason without transgressing the NLRA
so long as it does not use the fact of expulsion to achieve job discrim-
ination.4 a The state cause of action and the unfair labor practice have
a different substantive basis. The former may lie under circumstances
where the latter does not (and vice-versa). Thus, Mahoney would
have had a state cause of action even though the union had not inter-
fered with his right to work, and he would have had a basis for an
unfair labor practice complaint even though his expulsion had been
proper under state law.
Mahoney reads Laburnum as meaning that the only exception to
Garner, where the defendant's conduct happens to violate both state
and federal law, arises when the state remedy is supplemental. The
implied assumption is that the state decree in Laburnum would have
been struck down if the NLRB had been empowered to grant the
remedy which the employer sought. The ambiguous opinion in Labur-
num is susceptible to such an interpretation, but the result seems some-
what too mechanical to be the basis for reliable prediction.
Borne v. Laube,42 a decision of the 9th Circuit which supports
§ 159 (f), (g) and (h) (requiring registration, financial reports and non-communist
affidavits).
41a See Wollett and Lampman, The Law of Union Factionalismn: The Case of the
Sailors, 4 STAN. L. REv. 177. 204-206 (1952).42213 F.2d 407 (C.A.9, 1954), rehearing denied, 214 F.2d 349, cert. den., 75 S. Ct.
80. The court held that a territorial court has no jurisdiction of a common-law action
by a former member of the Teamsters' Union seeking reinstatement and damages,
damages being measured by wages lost when the union wrongfully induced the employer
to transfer him from truck driving to a job as an ordinary laborer. Relying on the
Garner case, the court held that the plaintiff's exclusive remedy was under Section
8 (b) (2) of the NLRA. Accord: Leiter Mfg. Co. v. Garment Workers, 34 LRRM
2748 (Tex. Civ. App., 1954).
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Mahoney, relies heavily on the dictum that "coincidence is as ineffective
as opposition."43 But this proposition is applicable only when Congress
has taken the particular subject matter in hand to the exclusion of state
laws.44 The fact of identity does not mean the automatic invalidity of
state measures. Coincidence is only one factor giving the courts a guide
to congressional intent.45
Suppose that the plaintiff in a case grounded on improper union dis-
cipline which among other things cost him his job brings an action
on a common law tort theory of conspiracy intentionally to inflict harm
and asks for reinstatement to the union, damages for loss of wages, and
damages for pain and suffering.46 If the Mahoney doctrine were fol-
lowed, the state might give the first and third items of relief but not the
second. Such a result, while logically defensible, seems rather artificial.
In summary, since Mahoney is concerned neither with injurious
picketing or striking nor employee freedom of choice, Garner is not
squarely in point. If Mahoney is a regulation of the right to work, Sec-
tion 14 (b) permits it. If Mahoney is a regulation of internal union
affairs, state power may be permissible on other grounds.
B. SUPPLEMENTAL STATE REGULATION
This problem arises when a state imposes duties which do not exist
under federal law and thus restricts conduct which Congress left un-
regulated. Resolution of the issue turns essentially on a judgment as to
what the silence of Congress means. Does it mean that Congress thought
that in order to implement a sound national labor policy the conduct
should be unrestrained? Or does silence mean only that Congress was
content to leave such matters to the states?
43 Charleston & Western R. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597, 604 (1915).
44 California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949), upholding coincidental state regulation
even though it was designed to protect the same interests as the federal statute.
45 Ibid.
46 This was substantially the problem except that the plaintiff did not seek rein-
statement, presented to the court in Kuzma v. Millinery Workers Union, 99 A.2d 833
(N.J. Sup. Ct., App. Div. 1953) The facts were as follows. Defendants caused plaintiff
to lose her job by threatening to strike unless she was discharged. Plaintiff's offense
was refusing to make a contribution to a gift collection for union officials. Held: The
traditional jurisdiction of a state court to enforce a common law tort liability has not
been removed by the NLRA even though the conduct constitutes an unfair labor
practice under that act. This is true even though back pay is the NLRB remedy. Back
pay orders are not private awards operating by way of penalty or damages. They are
public reparation orders, operating retrospectively as orders to stop unfair labor
practices. They are granted not to vindicate common law rights but to effectuate
national labor policies. Accord: Benjamin v. Foidl, 35 LRRM 2107 (Pa. Sup. Ct., E.D.
1954). Cf. Taylor v. Marine Cooks & Stewards Association, 256 P.2d 595 (Calif. Dist.
Ct. of Appeals 1953), where the court held that the remedies available under Section
8 (b) (2) of the NLRA do not preclude the states from granting reinstatement and
damages to plaintiffs improperly expelled from a union.
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The problem may be illustrated by the facts of the Washington case
of Hanke v. Teamsters."' The union picketed businessmen workers
(partner-operators of a used car lot who had no employees) for the
purpose of getting them to agree to restrict their hours of business. The
decree enjoining the picketing was sustained against attack on Four-
teenth Amendment grounds."8 However,. if such a situation presents
itself in a business over which the NLRB customarily exercises juris-
diction, the pre-emption question arises.
The matter is one not dealt with by the NLRA. The federal rule
closest to the point is Section 8 (b) (4) (A) which makes it an unfair
labor practice for a labor organization (through picketing or other
means) to induce employees concertedly to refuse to perform services
in the course of their employment in order to compel a self-employed
person to join the union." The union conduct in Hanke does not violate
this federal duty because apparently there was no showing that the
picket line induced concerted work stoppages, nor was it entirely clear
that the union intended to force the Hankes to join it. Thus, Garner
and Laburnum are not in point.
The leading cases are United Automobile Workers ( CIO) v.
O'Brien0 and Amalgamated Association of Street, etc. Employees v.
WERB.5 The former decision struck down a Michigan strike vote
statute as applied to an industry affecting interstate commerce; the
latter set aside an order restraining a strike pursuant to a statute requir-
ing arbitration of labor disputes in public utilities. The meaning of the
decisions is beclouded by the fact that the Court followed multiple lines
of analysis in each case. The ,cases seem to stand on two grounds:
(1) The state regulation is inconsistent with the national policy that
the terms and conditions of employment are to be fixed by free col-
lective bargaining, i.e., private agreement, with the parties free to strike
or lockout except as the NLRA says otherwise; it follows that Congress
has occupied the field of peaceful strikes for higher wages and closed it
to state regulation; (2) Section 7 of the NLRA guarantees to employees
the right to engage in concerted activities, e.g., striking and picketing;
these rights are protected against state, as well as employer, inter-
ference.52
47 33 Wn.2d 646, 207 P.2d 206 (1949).
18 Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950).
49 61 STAT. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (4) (A).
50 339 U.S. 454 (1950).
51340 U.S. 383 (1951).
52 Compare Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
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Most of the state courts which have faced the problem of supple-
mental regulation have resolved the doubt in favor of state power.
These decisions find support in International Union, United Automobile
Workers (AFL) v. WERB,54 which held that a state has jurisdiction to
restrain injurious conduct which the NLRB is without express power
to prevent and which therefore is either "governable by the state or it
is entirely ungoverned."
Set against these decisions is the language in the Garner opinion
wherein Justice Jackson states:
The detailed prescription of a procedure for restraint of specified types
of picketing would seem to imply that other picketing is to be free of
other methods and sources of restraint. For the policy of the national
Labor Management Relations Act is not to condemn all picketing but
only that ascertained by its prescribed processes to fall -within its pro-
hibitions. Otherwise it is implict in the Act that the public interest is
served by freedom of labor to use the weapon of picketing. For a state
to impinge on the area of labor combat designed to be free is quite as
much an obstruction of federal policy as if the state were to declare
picketing free for purposes or by methods which the federal acts prohibit."
In other words, there is a peripheral area about the prohibitions of
NLRA Section 8 (b) into which the states may not intrude because of
the danger of frustrating a national policy of permitting such conduct.
The dimensions of this area remain uncertain, but it is plain that they
are not fixed by the limits of coincidental regulation.
It seems likely that the dimensions of this peripheral area, at least so
far as union conduct is concerned, will be determined largely by the
test of whether the activity is protected by Section 7. This is, of course,
a federal question to be determined by the NLRB and the reviewing
courts." The mere fact that conduct violates a state law does not put
53 Goodwins, Inc. v. Hagedorn, 303 N.Y. 300, 101 N.E.2d 697 (1951). The court
enjoined picketing to force the employer to recognize the union as the bargaining
agent while the issue of representation was pending before the NLRB. The theory of
the decision was that state power could be exercised to, restrain conduct which was
not an unfair labor practice under the NLRA. See Hoover Co. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d
380 (C.A.6, 1951), and NLRB v. Electronics Equipment Co., 194 F.2d 650 (C.A. 2,
1952), on the question of whether such activity is protected by Section 7.
See also American Brake Shoe Co. v. Machinists, 373 Pa. 164 (1953) ; Isbrandtsen
Co. v. Schelero, 118 Fed. Supp. 579 (E.D.N.Y. 1954); Freyberg Inc. v. Garment
Workers, 128 N.Y.S.2d 470 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Weber,
265 S.W.2d 325 (Mo., 1954), Willoughby v. Machinists, 129 N.Y.S.2d 734 (Sup. Ct.,
1954) ; Hayes Freight Lines v. Teamsters, 33 LRRM 2671,-S.W.2d-(Tenn., 1954) ;
Milwaukee Store Co. v. Hosiery Workers, 33 LRRM 2885 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Milwaukee
County, 1954).
54 336 U.S. 245, 254 (1949).
55 346 U.S. at 499-500.
56 For a discussion of the types of concerted activity protected by Section 7, see Cox,
The Right to Engage in Concerted Activity, 26 IND. L. J. 320 (1951).
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it beyond Section 7 protection. 7 However, conduct which violates some
state laws is unprotected. 5 Thus, the issu& is: What kinds of state laws
when violated will be recognized as placing the conduct beyond the
pale of federal protection?
Since the fundamental inquiry in determining whether state regula-
tion intrudes into the field occupied exclusively by Congress is the same
whether coincidental or supplemental regulation is at issue,59 a basis
for differentiating between permissible and prohibited state regulation
is the one advanced supra-viz., whether the substantive basis for the
state decree is a concern for matters other than the method of resolving
conflicts of interest between employers and employees.
For example, take a situation where Union A representg the main-
tenance employees of a manufacturer. At a time when the contract is
properly open for renegotiation, Union A strikes and pickets the manu-
facturer. The objective is to get the manufacturer to agree that when
he has need to expand his plant he will do business solely with building
contractors who have entered into agreements whereby certain work
tasks will be done by members of Union A rather than by members of
Union B. The NLRB finds that the union's conduct is not violative of
the NLRA, and the manufacturer gets a state court injunction."0 If the
decree is grounded on a concern for protecting employers against in,
jurious picketing the objective of which is unlawful only when sought
by a union, under the suggested test the state action is prohibited. If,
on the other hand, the decree is grounded upon a state policy of pro-
hibiting restraints of trade whether they are employer, union, or other:
wise inspired, the state action is permissible.
In other words, the Supreme Court may well differentiate between
state power to regulate union activity the objective of which is unlawful
only because a union is seeking it, i.e., where the employer may agree
to the objective with impunity, and state power to regulate union
activity which has an unlawful objective in the sense that employer
agreement to the union's demand will violate a valid state law and
subject him to civil or criminal sanctions. The former is state protection
of employers from injurious picketing; the latter is'state protection of
some broader interest, e.g., the state policy against restraints of trade.
57 See, for example, NLRB v. Thayer Co., 213 F.2d 748 (C.A. 1, 1954), cert. den.;
75 S. Ct. 123.
58 See, for example, NLRB v. Fan-Steel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
5) California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949).
0 These are substantially the facts of Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Weber, 265 S.W-2d
325 (Mo., 1954), cert. granted, 75 Sup. Ct. 32.
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C. INDUSTRIES WHICH AFFECT COMMERCE BUT OVER WHICH THE
NLRB DECLINES TO TAKE JURISDICTION
The NLRB has the power to decline for policy reasons to take juris-
diction over matters which arise in industries affecting interstate com-
merce and which are therefore within the Board's statutory reach."'
The Supreme Court has left open the question of state power to regu-
late labor relations in such industries.62
The case of NYSLRB v. Wags Transportation System 3 illustrates
the difficulties which this situation creates. The union did not go to the
NLRB because at the time of the conduct constituting an unfair labor
practice, Board policy was to decline jurisdiction over taxicab com-
panies such as the employer's. Hence, the union sought relief under the
state labor relations act. The state board found the employer guilty of
an unfair labor practice. The court denied the board's petition for
enforcement, holding that the NLRA precludes local boards from ex-
tending their facilities to activities over which the NLRB has jurisdic-
tion, even though the NLRB has declined to exercise such jurisdiction.
The state board can acquire power over the matter, said the court, only
if it has executed an agreement with the NLRB ceding jurisdiction
under Section 10 (a) of the NLRA. No such agreement had been
reached between the New York Board and the NLRB because the New
York act does not conform to basic provisions of the NLRA, e.g., it
has no provision requiring non-Communist affidavits and no provision
comparable to Section 8 (c) dealing with freedom of expression. Hence,
the court concluded, no relief was available to the union under the state
statute.
If the Wags case is sound, there is a "no-man's land" where neither
management nor labor has either a state or a federal remedy for the
improper conduct of the other.64
Wags stands on Section 10 (a) of the NLRA, and 10 (a) bears only
on the ceding of jurisdiction by the NLRB to a state board enforcing
61 Haleston Drug Stores, Inc. v. NLRB, 187 F.2d 418 (C.A. 9, 1951), cert. den.,
342 U.S. 815 (1951).
62 Bldg. Trades Council v. Kinard Construction Co., 346 U.S. 933 (1954).
63 130 N.Y.S.2d 731 (N.Y. County 1954), afirined, 134 N.Y.S.2d 603 (App. Div.
1954).
64 Cox and Seidman, Federalism and Labor Relations, 64 HARV. L. REV. 211, 215-
218 (1950). Despite the decision in Wags, the New York Board is continuing to take
jurisdiction in these cases. See 34 LRR 279 and 35 LRR 19. See also Taxi Transit
Co., 33 LRRM 1526 (NY SLRB, 1954); Victory Chain, Inc., 34 LRRM 1664 (NY
SLRB, 1954). Accord: Cooper-Utter Lumber Co., 34 LRRM 1287 (Wisconsin Em-
ployment Relations Board, 1954) (Garner case does not preclude a state from taking
jurisdiction over two lumber companies whose dollar volume of interstate business is
less than the minimum established by NLRB policy.)
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a state labor -relations act. Therefore, Wags is not directly in point
where the question is the power of a state court to apply state law.
However, the Court in the context of Garner disregarded the distinction
between private rights enforced by judicial decree and public rights
enforced by administrative order.&a
The problem has recently been accentuated by the NLRB's new
policies which extend its practice of self-abnegation and thus enlarge
the dimensions of the "no-man's land" created by Wags.4 b The situa-
tion is intolerable and needs an early authoritative decision or legislative
correction.
11. TITLE III OF TAFT-HARTLEY AND BREACH OF THE LABOR
AGREEMENT
Conduct which constitutes a breach of a labor agreement may coin-
cidentally be an unfair labor practice under the NLRAes but the failure
to perform a contractual commitment is not necessarily an unfair labor
practice,"6 and the NLRB has eschewed the role of policing labor
agreements and providing remedies for the violation of their terms."'
It follows that regulation of the administration and enforcement of
collective bargaining agreements in industries affecting commerce does
not intrude into the field occupied by the NLRA, and that accordingly
a state may provide remedies for the breach of such agreements."' This
conclusion stands even where the state finds a strike to be in violation
C4a Compare Statin, Inc. v. IBEW, 34 LRRM 2258 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1954) and
Irving Subway Grating Co. v. Silverman, 117 Fed. Supp. 671 (E.D. N.Y. 1953)
(action not removable where NLRB has advised plaintiff to seek relief in state court)
with Universal Car Co. v. IAM, 35 LRRM 2087 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1954).
64b 34 LRR 223 (July 1, 1954) ; 34 LRR 261 (July 15, 1954). These policies are
discussed in 34 ANAI.Ysis 37 and 45. See also 34 LRR 409.
65In Boeing Airplane Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 988 (D.C. Cir. 1949), the court
refused to enforce a Board order, holding that a strike during the life of an agreement
containing a no-strike promise violated the notice provisions of Section 8 (d).
66 Old Line Life Ins. Co., 96 NLRB 499 (1951) ; NLRB v. Potlatch Forests, 189
F,2d 82 (C.A. 9, 1951) ; Textron Puerto Rico, 107 NLRB No. 42, 33 LRRM 1194
(1953).
67 Crown Zellerbach Corp., 95 NLRB 753 (1951).
68 This conclusion is supported by analogy to the Laburnum case insofar as the
state enforces a collective bargaining agreement much as it enforces any contract.
Moreover, supplemental state regulations which impose duties in addition to those
created by the NLRA have been invalidated only where they worked at cross-purposes
with the NLRA. While breach of a labor agreement is not an unfair labor practice
per se, the NLRB has recognized the importance of the parties living up to their
contracts. Employer conduct which would otherwise be an unfair labor practice is
privileged where the employees have struck in violation of this agreement. United
Elastic Corporation and Textile Workers Union, 84 NLRB 768 (1949). The parties
may stand on their written bargain and refuse to negotiate over a particular issue.
Jacobs Mfg. Co., 94 NLRB 1214 (1951), enforced 196 F.2d 680 (C.A. 2d, 1952).
Unilateral action is not a refusal to bargain where permitted by agreement. California
Portland Cement Co., 101 NLRB 1436 (1952). State enforcement of labor agreements
can hardly be said to work at cross-purposes with these policies.
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of a labor agreement and grants a remedy for breach. A strike in
breach of an agreement is not protected concerted activity under Sec-
tion 7 of the NLRA. 9
Moreover, the legislative history of Taft-Hartley manifests a Con-
gressional understanding that the courts will continue to handle the
enforcement of labor agreements and supports the conclusion that,
insofar as the NLRA is concerned, the states are free to prescribe rules
and provide remedies for their enforcement.
However, Section 301 (a) of Taft-Hartley provides:
Suit for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
tion representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined
in this Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in
any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties,
without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the
citizenship of the parties.70
This language may be interpreted in either one of two ways: (1)
Section 301 (a) merely provides a forum in which actions for breach
may conveniently be brought by parties who might otherwise be ham-
strung by procedural obstacles if only a state forum were available;
or (2) Section 301 (a) not only provides a federal forum but also
makes the parties to labor agreements affecting commerce federally
liable for any loss, damage, or injury caused by the violation of such
agreements.
The latter interpretation has been widely, although not definitively
followed, 7 principally on the ground that the former interpretation
would, since 301 (a) confers federal court jurisdiction over non-
diversity cases, make the section unconstitutional as an attempt to give
69 Scullin Steel Co., 65 NLRB 1294, 1317-1318 (1946).
7061 STAT. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185 (a).
71 Wilson & Co., Inc. v. Packing House Workers, 83 Fed. Supp. 162 (N.Y. 1949);
Textile Workers v. Aleo Mfg. Co., 94 Fed. Supp. 626 (M.D. N.C. 1950); Colonial
Hardwood Flooring Co., Inc. v. United Furniture Workers, 76 Fed. Supp. 493 (Md.
1948), affirmed, 168 F.2d 33 (C.A. 4, 1948) ; Pepper & Potter, Inc. v. Local 977, UAW-
CIO, 103 Fed. Supp. 684 (N.Y. 1952) ; Ludlow Mfg. & Sales Co. v. Textile Workers
Union, 108 Fed. Supp. 45 (Del. 1952). Electrical Workers v. Oliver Corp., 205 F.2d
376 (C.A. 8, 1953) ; Ass'n. of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse
Electric Corp., 210 F.2d 623 (C.A. 3, 1954), cert. granted, 347 U.S. 1010.
And state law does not govern substantive rights. Shirley-Herman Co., Inc. v.
Int'l. Hod Carriers, etc., 182 F.2d 806 (C.A. 2, 1950); Schatte v. Int'l. Alliance of
Theatrical Stage Employees, etc., 182 F.2d 158 (C.A. 9, 1950), cert. den., 340 U.S.
827 (1950) ; Int'l. Union of Operating Engineers, Local No. 181 v. Dahlem Construc-
tion Co., 193 F.2d 470 (C.A. 6, 1951) ; Waialua Agricultural Co. v. Sugar Workers,
114 Fed. Supp. 243 (Hawaii, 1953). Contra: Paterson Parchment Paper Co. v. Paper
Makers, 191 F.2d 252 (C.A. 3, 1951), cert. del., 342 U.S. 933; Boeing Airplane Co.
v. Aeronautical Industrial District Lodge No. 751 of I.A.M., 91 Fed. Supp. 596 (Wash..
1950), affirmed, 188 F.2d 356 (C.A. 9, 1951).
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federal jurisdiction over a case not arising under a law of the United
States.72
While it may be seriously doubted that Article III of the Constitution
precludes a procedural interpretation of 301 (a)71 most of the courts
have persisted in the conclusion that 301 (a) creates a federal cause of
action, the content of which shall be defined by creating and applying
federal substantive law. The result is the casting of a heavy shadow of
doubt on the applicability of state law to the enforcement of collective
bargaining agreements in industries affecting commerce.
The Erie decision" does not prohibit the federal courts from creating
federal law to resolve issues arising from valid statutory commands of
Congress. This body of law, since it bears on matters which are within
the constitutional competence of the federal government, is paramount.
Federal law developed under a substantive interpretation of Section
301 (a) is of this type. While the federal courts may, where the statute
whose commands they are carrying out does not require uniformity,
adopt the state rule as the federal rule, the very act of construing Sec-
tion 301 (a) as substantive would seem to prohibit such a result. The
principal justification for attributing to Congress an intention that
federal law be applicable to suits based upon breach of the labor agree-
ment must be grounded upon a judgment that a uniform substantive
law ought to apply to contractual arrangements between employers and
unions in industries affecting commerce.
The issue arises in its sharpest form when a complaint is filed in state
court and makes no reference to 301 (a) but purports to be grounded.
entirely on state law. A substantive interpretation of Section 301 (a)
7 2 Wilson & Co. v. Packing House Workers, 83 Fed. Supp. 162 (N.Y., 1949).
7r The argument that Section 301 (a) merely provides a forum may be stated as
follows. The integrated nature of federal statutory regulation of 'labor-management
.affairs, and Section 301's relation to this federal program is enough in itself to charac-
terize the jurisdictional grant in Section 301 as arising under the laws of the United
States. Put another way, Congress in this section established a protective jurisdiction.
Even though in any given suit a federal substantive issue may be remote, Congress
has deemed it necessary to provide a federal forum for the adjudication of disputes
arising out of contracts between parties whose rights and duties in the negotiation of
the contract are in large measure controlled by federal legislation, and whose conduct
vis-i-vis each other during the term of the agreement is in substantial part controlled
by this same legislation.
It is clear that Congress has the power to provide a substantive law governing
rights under labor agreements. By hypothesis it has chosen instead to permit state law
to operate in this area of labor-management relations, provided that the federal district
courts constitute an available forum for the enforcement of these state rights. State
law fills the gap. Its proper administration is essential to the over-all scheme Congress
has devised to facilitate the free flow of interstate commerce. See Textile Workers v.
American Thread Co., 113 Fed. Supp. 137, 140 (Mass. 1953). See also HAIRT &
WECHsLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEM, 744-747 (1953).
74 Erie R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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rests upon the assumed need for the uniform construction of a labor
agreement irrespective of where it is negotiated or performed. This
would seem to preclude the survival of a state cause of action under
possibly conflicting state law, for the existence of a separate state cause
of action would undercut the paramount federal policy of uniformity.
Moreover, a separate state cause of action would eliminate another
type of uniformity-viz., a usual uniformity of result whether the
parties litigate in a federal or state forum. If a state as well as a federal
cause of action exists, the primary contractual rights and duties of
labor and management will be simultaneously regulated by two rela-
tively independent bodies of possibly conflicting law.
The state court, therefore, should follow federal law whenever the
action for breach might have been initiated in a federal court under
301 (a). There is only one cause of action between contracting employ-
ers and unions in industries affecting commerce, and it is federal.7"
It follows that where such an action is brought in a state court, it is
removable. The normal rule in removal proceedings prohibits the court
from looking outside the complaint to determine whether or not the
suit arises under federal law."6 However, where federal jurisdiction
hinges on the status of one of the parties-viz., a union representing
employees in an industry affecting commerce, the court may ascertain
the existence of that status independently of the complaint. 7 Thus, the
action is removable even when the complaint does not mention 301 (a),
75 Fay v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 98 Fed. Supp. 278 (N.Y., 1951);
Fitzgerald v. Dictograph Products, Inc., 28 LRRM 2611 (N.Y. S. Ct., 1951). Cf.
Direct Transit Lines v. Mackey, 34 LRRM 2572,-Fed. Supp.-(Mich., 1954) (com-
plaint which alleges facts that constitute an unfair labor practice under the NLRA
raises a federal question and is removable, even though it purports to be grounded on
state law) ; Overton v. Int'l. Brotherhood, etc., 115 Fed. Supp. 764 (Mich., 1953). See
also Direct Transit Lines, Inc. v. Local Union No. 406, 29 LRRM 2492 (Mich. 1952),
30 LRRM 2471 (Mich., 1952), petition for inandamus directing remand denied, 199
F.2d 89 (C.A. 6, 1952) (complaint which alleges facts that constitute a violation of
Section 303 fo Taft-Hartley raises a federal question, and is removable even though
it purports to be grounded on state law). Cf. Pocahantas Term. Corp. v. Portland
Bldg., & Const. Co., 93 Fed. Supp. 217 (Maine, 1950). Contra: Telephone Co. v.
Communications Workers, 114 Fed. Supp. 334 (Calif. 1953). See also Castle & Cooke
Terminals v. ILWU, 110 Fed. Supp. 247 (Hawaii, 1953).
The states probably have power to provide causes of action which are grounded on
the terms of the collective bargaining agreement but are not cognizable under 301 (a),
e.g., employee suits for back wages, as long as such state action does not conflict with
federal substantive law developed under 301 (a). For an interesting case bearing on
this issue, see Ass'n of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric
Corporation, 210 F.2d 623 (C.A. 4, 1954), cert. granted, 347 U.S. 1010.
76 Gully v. First National Bank, 229 U.S. 109 (1936).
77 Fay v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 98 Fed. Supp. 278 (N.Y. 1951). See
also Overton v. Int'l. Brotherhood, etc., 115 Fed. Supp. 764 (Mich., 1953) (even though
complaint does not specifically refer to federal law, court may take judicial notice that
federal law is necessarily brought into play by the allegations of the complaint) ; Direct
Transit Lines v. Mackey, 34 LRRM 2572,-Fed. Supp.-(Mich., 1954) ; Pocahantas
Term Corp. v. Portland Bldg. & Constr. Tr. C., 93 Fed. Supp. 217 (Maine, 1950).
[FEB.
1955] STATE POWER TO REGULATE LABOR RELATIONS -23
if the view is adopted that the federal cause of action pre-empts the
field. The point is important because the Norris-LaGuardia Act makes
an injunction unavailable in the federal courts for breach of a collective
bargaining agreement, at least where the conduct at issue is covered
by Section 4 of that statute."
8
It does not follow, however, even assuming that 301 (a) creates a
federal body of substantive law which pre-empts the field, that state
courts are without power to enforce federal law. Where the federal
court is without original jurisdiction to grant the remedy sought, it may
be argued that a state court is free to grant a state remedy for the
federal right and that the case should be remanded."0
On the other hand, if the view is adopted that Section 301 (a) merely
provides a federal forum for protection of the rights and duties acquired
by the exercise of the power conferred on employers and unions in
industries affecting commerce to enter into labor agreements, no serious
inroads on the powers of the states will result. State law will operate
very much as it does under the Erie doctrine. The federal courts will
follow state rules, and state power to fashion and follow such rules will
remain largely unrestricted.
Most of the pieces of this puzzle will fall into place if the Supreme
Court rules on the question of whether 301 (a) is substantive or pro-
cedural. The issue has been placed before the Court, and unless it
manages to dispose of the case on other grounds, a decision should be
forthcoming this term.8"
78 Alcoa S.S. Co. v. McMahon, 173 F.2d 567 (C.A. 2, 1949), cert. den., 338 U.S. 821.
For an excellent discussion of the remedies available in federal court for breach of a
labor agreement, see Cox, Grievance Arbitration in the Federal Courts, 67 Hav. L.
Rnv. 591 (1954).
79Telephone Co. Communications Workers, 114 Fed. Supp. 334 (Calif., 1953)
(alternative ground for granting motion to remand). See also Castle & Cooke Ter-
minals v. ILWU, 110 Fed. Supp. 247 (Hawaii, 1953). Cf. American Optical Co. v.
Andert, 108 Fed. Supp. 252 (Mo. 1952); Hat Corp. of America v. United Hatters,
114 Fed. Supp. 890 (Conn., 1953). But see Direct Transit Lines v. Mackey, 34 LRRM
2572,-Fed. Supp.-(Mich., 1954). See also Overton v. Intl. Brotherhood, etc., 115
Fed. Supp. 764 (Mich., 1953); Pocahantas Term Corp. v. Portland Bldg. & Constr.
Tr. C., 93 Fed. Supp 217 (Maine 1950). Cf. Direct Transit Lines, Inc. v. Local Union
No. 406, 29 LRRM 2492 (Mich., 1952), petition for inandamus directing remand
denied, 199 F.2d 89 (C.A. 6, 1952).
State enforcement of the federal right in breach cases does not intrude on thejurisdiction of the NLRB. Thus, Garner is inapposite. It follows that the states have
concurrent jurisdiction to enforce the federal cause of action, unless it can be said
that such jurisdiction was impliedly withheld. Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130(1876).80 Association of Employees v. Westinghouse Corp., 210 F.2d 623 (C.A. 4, 1954),
cert. granted, 347 U.S. 1010.
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III. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
In order to complete the picture a brief comment should be made on
the extent to which the subject of this paper is a political issue. Con-
gress has the power to redefine the areas of local and national pre-
dominance,8 and a number of proposals were introduced in the last
Congress which would have the effect of substantially enlarging state
power to regulate labor relations in industries affecting commerce.
S. 2650, as reported out by committee, authorizes the states to take
jurisdiction of labor disputes over which the NLRB declines to assert
jurisdiction. The proposal made by Senator Ives of New York supple-
ments this provision of S. 2650. It would permit the NLRB to cede
jurisdiction to state agencies without the present Taft-Hartley limita-
tion (Section 10 (a)) that the applicable state law must conform to the
federal law.
Three other proposed amendments to Taft-Hartley are noteworthy.
S. 2650 also provides that the states may enact and enforce laws to deal
in emergencies with disputes which, if permitted to occur or continue,
will constitute a clear and present danger to the health or safety of the
people-unless the federal government has intervened in the dispute
pursuant to Taft-Hartley. This proposal is intended to overcome the
force of the Supreme Court's decision in Amalgamated Street, etc.,
Employees v. WERB.8"
The proposal of Senator Goldwater of Arizona provides that nothing
in Taft-Hartley shall be construed to nullify the power of any state or
territory to regulate strikes, picketing, boycotts, or lockouts-provided
that the state regulation does not authorize conduct which is unlawful
under Taft-Hartley, and provided further that a state may not de-
termine questions of representation affecting commerce or impair the
right to bargain collectively. This suggestion would, if enacted, reverse
:he rule of the O'Brien83 and Garner" cases and most of the Amalga-
ratea- case.
Senators Kennedy of Massachusetts .2 Douglas of Illinois proposed
removal of the power conferred on the states by Section 14 (b) of Taft-
Hartley to regulate union security agreements more rigorously than
the federal act does. This amendment would render inapplicable to
81 In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891) ; Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin. 328
U.S. 408 (1946).
82 Supra note 51.
83 Supra note 50.
84 Supra note 8.
85 Supra note 51.
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industries affecting commerce the right-to-work statutes of the various
states.
All of these proposals were cast into limbo during the last Congres-
sional session. But it can fairly be anticipated that some or all of them
will subsequently be revived-at least in some form.
This paper is much too long already to permit a discussion of the
pros and cons of these proposals. Obviously they are highly controver-
sial involving, as they do, the familiar clash between the values in-
herent in the local handling of problems set off against the values
involved in the uniform treatment of matters which in economic sig-
nificance transcend state lines.
It may be said, however, that if states' rights is the interest to be
served, the statute should be amended to give the states as much free-
dom to pass legislation less restrictive than Taft-Hartley as they are
given to pass legislation more restrictive. Amendments which do not
cut both ways may serve sound labor policies but they can hardly be
said to be grounded on a concern for states' rights.
As a minimum, Congress should make it clear that nothing in the
National Labor Relations Act curtails the power of the states to regu-
late all aspects of labor-management relations in industries over which
the National Labor Relations Board will not exercise jurisdiction, thus
setting at rest the doctrine of the Wags" case.
sO Supra note 63.
